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ALISON FRANK
“THE PROPRIETOR OF STOCK,” ADAM SMITH CONTENDED in 1776, “is properly a citizen
of the world, and is not necessarily attached to any particular country.” The mobility
of the stockholder, like that of the merchant—who Smith likewise noted was “not
necessarily the citizen of any particular country”—challenged the modern state try-
ing to develop its own economy. The stockholder could invest abroad to avoid paying
an obnoxious tax; worse yet, “a very triﬂing disgust will make [the merchant] remove
his capital, and together with it all the industry which it supports, from one country
to another.”1 In the twenty-ﬁrst century, this observation has inspired studies of
international economic activity that, despite myriad disagreements, tend to agree
that “globalization challenges the importance of the nation-state and alters the bal-
ance of power between states and markets in favor of the latter,” and that the major
beneﬁciaries of this phenomenon are multinational corporations.2 Even in the
Golden Age of global commerce that preceded the First World War, however, mer-
chants and stockholders could not, in every instance, simply turn tail and ﬂee over
a “triﬂing disgust.” Instead, they had to negotiate terms and reach settlements with
a profusion of imperial, national, provincial, and local governments.3 This was par-
ticularly true of the oil industry, which had reached global proportions by that time.
From 1910 to 1912, two of the world’s most powerful corporate entities—“the best
known of all international companies,” the Standard Oil Trust, and the second-larg-
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1 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London, 1776).
Stockholder: Book V, chap. II, art. 2, para. 6; Merchant: Book III, chap. IV, para. 24.
2 Ju ¨rgen Osterhammel and Niels Petersson, Globalization: A Short History, trans. Dona Geyer
(Princeton, N.J., 2005), 6.
3 Frederick Cooper, “What Is the Concept of Globalization Good For? An African Historian’s
Perspective,” African Affairs 100 (2001): 194. Cooper notes: “for all the growth in international trade
in recent decades, as a percentage of world GDP it has only barely regained levels found before the First
World War.” Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson argue that “world capital markets were
almost certainly as well integrated in the 1890s as they were in the 1990s.” O’Rourke and Williamson,
“When Did Globalisation Begin?” European Review of Economic History 6 (2002): 4. See also David
Armitage, “Is There a Pre-History of Globalization?” in Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor, eds.,
Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective (New York, 2004), 165–176.
16est country by population in Europe, Austria-Hungary—engaged in a bitter, pro-
tracted dispute that Austria’s leading daily newspaper dubbed a “Petroleum War.”4
On the surface a conﬂict about Austria’s regulation of Standard’s activities within
the empire, the Petroleum War epitomized the fundamental riddle of capitalist de-
velopment in this period: even powerful multinational corporations with global pre-
tensions were associated with—and in some instances beholden to—national gov-
ernments. To the extent that the turn of the century was a globalized age, and most
historians accept that it was, international capitalism did not diminish the signiﬁ-
cance of states.
The outcome of the Petroleum War would lead Standard’s chief diplomat, Wil-
liam Herbert Libby, to conclude, “American capital invested abroad—even in accord
with the strictest treaty provisos—may be subjected to the most arbitrary and in-
equitable treatment by a foreign government, because neither the American Exec-
utive nor the Department of State is vested with any discretionary power to adopt—
whatever the crisis—suitable retaliatory action or adequate industrial reprisals.”5
Libby’s indignation reminds us that more than oil was at stake in this dispute. At its
heart lay two incompatible approaches to the question of sovereignty—in particular,
the nature of foreign stockholders’ rights in a domestically incorporated joint stock
company. It was not, strictly speaking, Standard that had run into trouble in Austria,
but rather a Viennese subsidiary that was legally an Austrian company, and not an
American one at all. This raised the question of how to determine a company’s
“nationality.” Was it based on the ﬁrm’s legal site of incorporation? The citizenship
of its board of directors, or of its major shareholders? The location of its production
facilities, or of its consumer markets? The answer to these questions was more than
academic: access to the largest consumer markets in Europe hung in the balance.
To prod the State Department into action, Standard argued that not just oil revenue,
but in fact all American stockholders’ foreign investments were at risk.
Libby’s dilemma exposes the ﬂuidity between companies’ national and multina-
tional identiﬁcation at the same time that it demonstrates the value of stubbornly
international business history. Capitalism in this period, despite individual compa-
nies’ penchants for border-crossing, was deeply national—even if the historical com-
munityincreasinglyrecognizesitseffectsastransnational.Headsofcorporationsand
heads of state alike operated in a paradoxical political and economic climate char-
acterized by what Eric Hobsbawm called “the strange schizophrenia of the capitalist
world economy”—at once internationalist and organized around national econo-
mies.6 Multinational corporations—in particular, oil companies—could get caught
between the international markets in which they operated and the national gov-
ernments whose support they sometimes needed to protect their extended opera-
4 Mira Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from the Co-
lonial Era to 1914 (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), 62. Austria-Hungary, with a population of 49,418,600, had
more residents than all of South America (48,946,437). The Library Atlas of the World, vol. 2: Foreign
Countries (Chicago, 1912), 110. “Der Petroleumkrieg,” Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), September 24, 1910.
5 William Herbert Libby to Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox, December 20, 1912, National
Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 59, College Park, Md., Decimal File 1910–1929
[hereafter NARA, RG 59], Box 4462, 363.113 V 13/95.
6 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 1875–1914 (New York, 1989), 40, 41, 54. See also Charles
Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,”
American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (June 2000): 808.
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sidiaries founded as “national” joint stock companies and incorporated according to
the regulations of a particular state.7 These companies were beholden to stockhold-
ers and run by merchants who, according to Smith, were stateless—but they were
taxed and regulated locally.8
In countless ways, oil companies’ successful operations depended on the benev-
olence of states. Vertically integrated oil companies had to secure access to crude
oil in areas of production, transport that oil to reﬁning facilities, and arrange for the
distributionofreﬁnedproductstoconsumermarkets;sometimeseachofthesestages
occurred on a different continent. And in each context, oil companies had to navigate
through wide varieties of tax regimes, tariffs on crude and/or reﬁned products, pro-
cedures for granting concessions, regulations controlling exploration and extraction
rights, laws linking mineral rights to or dividing them from land ownership, labor
laws, and widely diverse levels of infrastructure enabling or limiting distribution,
including railroads. This created not only situations where state interference could
become a matter of more than “triﬂing disgust” for corporations, but also situations
in which only proactive state support could enable corporations to continue oper-
ation.
To say that states were, in the words of Hobsbawm, the “basic building-blocks”
of the capitalist world economy, however, is not to say that they were monolithic or
even consistent in representing “national interest.”9 After all, Standard Oil’s request
for State Department assistance on behalf of its Austrian subsidiary was synchronous
with the Justice Department’s prosecution of Standard Oil before the Supreme
Court. The same federal government that made Standard the target of investigation
and prosecution at home aggressively advocated its foreign operations—even bor-
rowing Libby’s language to make its case. The extended confrontation between Stan-
dard, the U.S. Department of State, Austria-Hungary, and Austrian reﬁners thus
exposes both the interdependence of diplomats and captains of industry, govern-
ments and nongovernmental organizations (including for-proﬁt corporations), and
also their ability to take different positions in different contexts.
The Petroleum War was waged not only between states, but also within and across
them, and to study it requires breaking down barriers between state and non-state
agents. In both Austria and the United States, a dizzying array of actors, some out-
ward-looking, some inward-looking, some governmental, some private, participated
in this dispute. Within the imperial government in Vienna, there were no fewer than
ﬁve ministries responsible for overseeing various aspects of the oil industry. Alter-
nately at odds with and beholden to the imperial government were Galician crude
oil producers, Galician petroleum reﬁners, other Austrian petroleum reﬁners, Aus-
7 Alice Teichova, “Multinationals in Perspective,” in Alice Teichova, Maurice Le ´vy-Leboyer, and
Helga Nussbaum, eds., Multinational Enterprise in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 1986), 364.
8 Practical considerations such as “transport costs and other transaction costs” also hampered the
mobility of multinational corporations. Dani Rodrik, “Symposium on Globalization in Perspective: An
Introduction,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, no. 4 (1998): 4. Factors tying multinational corpo-
rations to a particular area include “the control and exploitation of . . . raw material,” “domination of
theentireworldmarketorpartofitforacertainproduct,”theevasionof“tariffswhichwouldbeimposed
were the goods imported,” and acquiring “a foothold in one country by participating in its economic life
for further expansion to other countries.” Teichova, “Multinationals in Perspective,” 367.
9 Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 40.
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rangeofpersonsandinstitutionswereinvolvedontheAmericanside.Standardacted
within Austria through its Austrian subsidiary, Vacuum Oil Company AG, Vienna,
but let Libby direct its negotiations with the State Department in Washington, D.C.,
directly from his Manhattan ofﬁce. Within the State Department, responsibility for
managing the crisis was shared by the newly minted Division of Near Eastern Affairs,
the Bureau of Trade Relations, the Counselor’s Ofﬁce, and the ambassador in Vi-
enna. Libby looked to Congress for further assistance, and the State Department
tried to involve the Department of the Treasury. The various participants had mo-
tivations, incentives, goals, and perspectives that varied synchronically from those of
their allies and opponents, and diachronically, based both on external circumstances
and on the experience they gained during this protracted dispute. Attempts to
present a united front when interests and incentives were not only diverse but in fact
irreconcilable were characteristic of European and American diplomatic relations
in this period. They reﬂect asymmetric relationships and unexpected alliances that
arose within the oil industry and in its interaction with states—relationships that
complicate the notion of national interest.
Grouping historical actors according to their interests in petroleum creates links
across national boundaries and nearly impermeable divisions within nation-states.
A country’s leading oil companies, engaged in merciless struggles with other coun-
tries’ leading oil companies for global markets and access to production, could claim
to need and deserve government support abroad. However, even if national gov-
ernments were inclined to protect purportedly “national” industries from “foreign”
competition, they were less able to discern a “universal” or “national” interest in
those same companies’ domestic activities. Too many different groups—producers,
reﬁners, distributors, wholesale and retail merchants, consumers—could claim to
represent that interest best. Underneath the fac ¸ade of national interest—a phrase
used generously by all the protagonists in this dispute—lay complex and unbalanced
internal struggles for both economic power and moral authority. Nevertheless, to
succeed in international markets, even companies as powerful as Standard Oil found
that they needed to link their business interest to the putative national interest when
calling on the state for support. Even states as prominent in their advocacy of the
free market as the United States were willing to use diplomacy to promote their own
business interests abroad.
THE PETROLEUM WAR OF 1910 WAS POSSIBLE thanks to a historical circumstance that
is easily forgotten: in that distant age, both the United States and Austria-Hungary
were oil-producing states whose petroleum production vastly exceeded domestic de-
mand.10 Thanks to its Galician oilﬁelds, Austria-Hungary was, after the United
States and the Russian Empire, the world’s third-largest oil-producing country, ac-
10 Harold Williamson and Arnold Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination,
1859–1899 (Evanston, Ill., 1959), 108–124. By the early 1880s, petroleum represented the United States’
fourth most valuable export; ibid., 338. Ralph Hidy and Muriel Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, 1882–
1911 (New York, 1955), 124. The Hidy and Hidy volume is the ﬁrst in a four-volume series, History of
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), made possible when, in 1947, Standard Oil agreed to open its own
records to scholars over whose work it would have no control. According to the archivist responsible
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AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW FEBRUARY 2009counting for 5 percent of global oil production in 1908.11 At that time, the United
States was unchallenged as the global leader in oil production (with over 60 percent),
and the Standard Oil Trust dominated the U.S. and western European markets.12
Thanks to recent discoveries of major new oilﬁelds at Spindletop (1901), Masjid-
i-Suleiman (1908), and Tampico (1910), newcomers Texas, Persia, and Mexico were
just beginning to join the ranks of global production leaders. The oil industry of 1910
featured not only different producers, but also different products and different prob-
lems. One hundred years ago, crude oil’s most useful, proﬁtable, and widespread
reﬁned product was not gasoline or fuel oil but kerosene, used to light the homes
and public buildings of rural Europe and America long after it had been replaced
by gas and electricity in their major cities.13 In an era in which the world’s petroleum
resources truly seemed limitless, securing control over markets with high demand
was a greater competitive challenge than securing access to productive oil ﬁelds.
Competition was particularly ﬁerce in Europe.
Analysts at the French investment bank Le Cre ´dit Lyonnais reported in 1908 that
Galicia was the last European bastion of resistance to the American trust, other
competitors appearing “to have found it more practical to get along with [their]
powerful rival.”14 When Austrian reﬁners suffering from their own problems with
domestic oversupply targeted Germany and France, they did not fundamentally
threaten Standard’s position. But the looming dissolution of the Trust back in the
United States added a new dimension to Standard’s concerns. Despite its reputation
for omnipotence, Standard Oil worried, according to John D. Rockefeller’s biog-
rapher, that “its monopoly was swiftly crumbling at home and overseas.” After the
federal circuit court in St. Louis ruled against the Trust in late 1909, and before the
Supreme Court’s anticipated conﬁrmation of that decision was announced in May
of 1911, Standard’s authority at home and abroad seemed vulnerable to an unpar-
alleled degree.15 Austria’s entry into the western European market exacerbated
Standard’s fear that its carefully constructed control was fragile and threatened with
collapse. Under competition not only from the organization of Austrian oil export-
for the Exxon/Mobil papers at the University of Texas, the papers referenced by the Hidys have since
disappeared; it would therefore be impossible to reproduce their work.
11 The erstwhile Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, which marked Austria-Hungary’s border with
the Russian Empire, is now divided between Poland and Ukraine. In 1895, the U.S. produced 51 percent
of the world’s petroleum, Russia 44 percent, and Austria-Hungary 1.4 percent. In 1909, the United States
produced 61 percent, Russia 22 percent, and Austria-Hungary 5 percent. Robert Schwarz, ed., Petro-
leum-Vademecum: International Petroleum Tables, 7th ed. (Berlin, 1930), 2–5. On the Galician oil in-
dustry, see Alison Frank, Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia (Cambridge, Mass., 2005).
12 By 1908, Standard controlled an estimated 75 percent of the kerosene market in western Europe.
Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise, 83; Hidy and Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, 565;
Michael Smith, The Emergence of Modern Business Enterprise in France, 1800–1930 (Cambridge, Mass.,
2006), 424.
13 In 1904, illuminating oil accounted for 58 percent of the total output of major reﬁnery products
in the U.S. In 1909, 64.2 percent of illuminating oil produced in the U.S. was exported. However, whereas
kerosene distribution grew by only 2.5 times between 1899 and 1919, fuel oil distribution in the U.S.
domestic market grew by 2,500 percent. Williamson and Daum, The American Petroleum Industry, 168,
169.
14 “Note sur les Pe ´troles de Galicie,” June 1908, Archives historiques du Cre ´dit Lyonnais [hereafter
AHCL], Direction des e ´tudes e ´conomiques et ﬁnancie `res [hereafter DEEF], 30167, E ´tude no. 303.2,
13.
15 Ron Chernow, Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. (New York, 1998), 431, 554.
20 Alison Frank
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(OLEX), but also from the European Petroleum Union, British Petroleum, and Rus-
sian oil companies, Standard participated in “intensiﬁed trade tactics” to defend its
European market share, turning 1910 into a year of struggle that the editor of the
Petroleum Review believed would “commercially far outshine not a few international
differences.”16
The conﬂict between the Austrian government and Standard erupted in the Aus-
trian province of Galicia, where petroleum production dated back to the 1850s. Stan-
dard grew interested in Galicia in the 1890s, following the discovery of new beds in
the Borys aw basin that had caused a sudden and dramatic increase in Galician pro-
duction and the plummeting of Standard’s sales in the monarchy.17 Anticipating re-
sistance to the “standardization” of Europe’s domestic markets, the Trust expanded
abroad under the name of one of its afﬁliates (in which it had acquired a 75 percent
interest upon the foundation of the Standard Oil Trust in 1882): the Rochester, New
York–based Vacuum Oil Company.18 Vacuum Oil Company AG, Vienna, was duly
chartered, under Austrian laws of incorporation, in 1899.19 In 1904, driven by high
tariffs on reﬁned products designed to protect Galician crude oil producers and in
response to the creation of OLEX, it built a large reﬁnery in Czechowitz-Dzieditz/
Czechowice-Dziedzice, in Austrian Silesia.20 By 1910, Vacuum had about $3 million
(U.S.) invested in manufacturing plants and equipment in Austria-Hungary, not in-
cluding liquid capital for commercial purposes.21
ThemerepresenceofaStandardOilsubsidiaryonAustriansoildidnotinevitably
lead to a diplomatic dispute. In 1910, however, the Austrian petroleum industry had
reached a point of crisis that its participants recognized they could not resolve them-
selves. Vacuum’s competitive tactics had intensiﬁed difﬁculties for Austrian reﬁners
that dated back to the alleviation of a Galician overproduction crisis at the beginning
of the twentieth century. When overproduction had threatened to drive producers
out of business, the central government initiated an ambitious program to raise crude
oil prices by constructing the largest oil reﬁnery in non-Russian Europe, converting
all public lines of the Austrian state railway from coal power to petroleum, and
purchasing 1.5 million tons of crude oil annually—approximately 75 percent of all
the crude expected to be produced in Galicia in the year the agreement was
reached—at a rate nearly double its market value at the time.22 By raising the market
16 Petroleum Review (London) 35, no. 513 (October 7, 1911): 235–236.
17 Hidy and Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, 131.
18 Ibid., 46–47, 110; Williamson and Daum, The American Petroleum Industry, 476.
19 When founded in 1899, it had 200,000 Austrian crowns in capital; by 1908, capitalization had
increased to 20,000,000 crowns. “Vacuum Oil Company Aktien Gesellschaft a ` Buda Pest,” October 1919,
AHCL, DEEF, 30166, Note no. 4807, 1–2.
20 Another subsidiary, Vacuum Oil Company Reszvenytarsasag, Budapest, built a reﬁnery in Al-
ma ´sfu ¨zito ˝, Hungary. Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise, 87; Hidy and Hidy, Pioneering
in Big Business, 513. Vacuum’s director estimated the capacity of the two reﬁneries together at about
13 percent of Austro-Hungarian production. Letter from George Washington Hooker to Charles Denby,
General Consul of the United States, June 15, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 25024/5.
21 Recognizing the importance of transportation and storage of petroleum, Standard also owned a
40 percent interest in the Galician Crude Oil Transport and Storage Company. Libby to Knox, June 15,
1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 25024. Hidy and Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, 513.
22 Stefan Sulimirski, “Stanis aw Szczepanowski, Z ˙yciorys,” Przemys  Naftowy 4, no. 11 (June 1929):
324–326; Bankers Trust Company, The Sixth Country in Europe (New York, 1927), 10; Frank, Oil Empire,
165–169.
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reﬁners, which were unable to pass on the increase to their customers.23 These sub-
stantial problems notwithstanding, when Austrian reﬁners learned that Standard Oil
had entered their market (several years after the fact), they blamed their woes on
the presumed interference of so powerful a rival.24
Austrian reﬁners believed that Standard was using Vacuum to drive them out of
their own domestic market.25 According to Ludwig Neurath, the director of a leading
Viennese bank (the O ¨sterreichische Credit-Anstalt fu ¨r Handel und Gewerbe), Vac-
uum overbid other Austrian reﬁneries’ purchase offers for crude oil and underbid
their prices for reﬁned products.26 While the Austrian industry was troubled by its
own internal ﬂaws (most prominent among them a lack of sufﬁcient organization on
the part of either producers or reﬁners), Neurath argued in a 1910 expose ´ that the
primary cause of its “chaotic condition” was the “business politics of Standard Oil
Company, which uses its Austro-Hungarian subsidiary, Vacuum Oil Company, to
carry on in the most intense manner its destructive politics in a battle against the
domestic petroleum industry.”27 The trouble had started when, driven by stagnant
domestic consumption and rapidly increasing production, Austrian reﬁners learned
at the beginning of the twentieth century what Standard had long realized: access
to export markets was the most signiﬁcant question of the day.28 Without established
export markets, efﬁcient transportation, or adequate storage facilities, Galician re-
ﬁners fell victim to every dramatic alteration in local or global production and the
resulting shifts in prices. Economic analysts employed by the Cre ´dit Lyonnais an-
23 The Austrian government strongly pressured reﬁners to offer stable and low consumer prices.
Testimony of Sektionschsef Brosche (Handelsministerium), “Enquete u ¨ber die Krise in der Mineralo ¨lin-
dustrie,” O ¨sterreichisches Staatsarchiv [hereafter O ¨StA], Ministerium fu ¨r o ¨ffentliche Arbeiten [here-
after Mfo ¨A], F664, Z1079 XIV 1910, 10.
24 Viceroy Micha  Bobrzyn ´ski feared that three English companies that had purchased nearly three
dozen wells along with connected pipelines in 1910 might have acquired them “at the expense of the
American Standard Company.” Tsentral’nyi Derzhavnyi Istorychnyi Arkhiv Ukraı ¨ny, f.146, op. 6, sp.
1338, no. 245.
25 Both contemporary business analysts at the French bank Le Cre ´dit Lyonnais and historians of
Standard’s European operations agree. “Note sur les Pe ´troles de Galicie,” June 1908, AHCL, DEEF,
30167, E ´tude no. 303.2, 15–16; Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial
Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 439.
26 Ludwig Neurath, “Massnahmen zur Sanierung der Lage der o ¨sterr. Petroleumindustrie,” March
5, 1910, O ¨StA, Mfo ¨A, F664, Z354. The Credit-Anstalt had been involved in attempts to organize the
industry since at least 1902. “The Condition of the Galician Petroleum Industry,” Petroleum Review,
September 26, 1908, 181–182, and October 10, 1908, 199–200. Neurath, a “remarkable specialist in the
petroleum industry,” was a member of the governing board of thirty-one industrial enterprises. Bernard
Michel, Banques et banquiers en Autriche au de ´but du 20e sie `cle (Paris, 1976), 147, 160.
27 Neurath, “Massnahmen zur Sanierung der Lage der o ¨sterr. Petroleumindustrie.”
28 In 1909, Austria consumed only 14 percent of its own petroleum production. Galician production
had exceeded Austro-Hungarian consumption every year since 1895. Joseph Mendel and Robert
Schwarz, eds., Internationale Petroleumstatistik, vol. 2: Oesterreich-Ungarn (Vienna, 1912), 10. For an
argument that Austria-Hungary’s low level of consumption was best explained by its burdensome tax
on petroleum consumption, see “Petroleum Consumption in Austria-Hungary,” Petroleum Review, July
6, 1907, 19. The policy of inﬂating domestic prices in order to subsidize lower prices abroad did not help.
R. Zaloziecki, “A Review of the Galician Petroleum Industry in 1898,” Petroleum Industrial and Tech-
nical Review, February 18, 1899, 9–12. On the overproduction crisis, see Frank, Oil Empire, 140, 149–155,
169–172. On Austria’s consumption more broadly, see John Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Cus-
toms Union: Economic Development in Austria-Hungary in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J., 1983),
6. The Austrian overproduction crisis was only one part of a larger glut of oil initiated by an economic
depression and drop in demand for oil in the Russian Empire that began in 1900. Daniel Yergin, The
Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York, 1991), 117.
22 Alison Frank
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battle with Standard, and they did not believe it was one that Austrian reﬁners could
win.29 A large part of the problem for Austrian reﬁners was that freight costs on the
Austrian railroads were notoriously uncompetitive. Since Standard could ship oil
from the United States across the Atlantic to ports in Europe—including Ham-
burg—more cheaply than Austrian companies could send it via rail, Austrian reﬁners
could match Standard’s prices only by selling at a loss.30 At the height of overpro-
duction, Austrian reﬁners were offering reﬁned products in France at a price well
below the amount charged by French reﬁners, hoping that by selling at a loss they
might secure a foothold in the market.31 Consistent with a general tendency to hold
John Rockefeller personally responsible for Standard’s every step, Austrian pro-
ducer/reﬁner William MacGarvey complained that Rockefeller “will not allow us in
any country in Europe!”32 Neurath conﬁrmed that a decade’s worth of negotiations
with the Americans over European export markets had led to naught.33
Vacuum, not surprisingly, had a different perspective on the origins of its dispute
with Austrian reﬁners. OLEX was a joint stock company that organized the export
activities of Austrian reﬁners by “centralizing offers, allocating orders, and seeking
todevelopforeignsales.”34ItservedonlythoseAustrianreﬁnerswhoagreedtoabide
by the production quotas apportioned to its members. Although many Galician re-
ﬁners did not participate in OLEX, its clientele included the most powerful reﬁning
companies within Austria.35 Vacuum was dissatisﬁed with its proposed allotment,
and subsequently refused to participate. Given that the Galician reﬁners who con-
trolled OLEX’s board of directors were openly known to be engaged in a “battle
against competition from Vacuum Oil,” Vacuum’s complaints that its allotment was
punitively small are credible.36 When sudden increases in production in 1909 led to
29 “Note sur les Pe ´troles de Galicie,” June 2008, AHCL, DEEF, 30167, E ´tude no. 303.2, 11–12.
30 In 1898, Galician petroleum was sold in Germany at prices between 17.05 and 19.80 francs, while
U.S. reﬁned oil was sold in Hamburg at 16 francs. “Prix de Revient du Pe ´trole Rafﬁne ´ en Galicie,” in
“Gisements Pe ´trolife `res de Schodnica (Galicie): Concessions de Messieurs Wolski et Odrzywolski,”
March 30, 1898, AHCL, DEEF, 25245, 3–4. The cost of shipping Standard’s oil across the Atlantic
dropped sharply with the introduction of oceangoing steam tankers in 1886. Hidy and Hidy, Pioneering
in Big Business, 145–146. Thanks to the spread of steamships and the drops in freight rates, the trans-
portation of a ton of wheat from New York to Mannheim cost no more than the transport of the same
from Berlin to Kassel. Sebastian Conrad, Globalisierung und Nation im Deutschen Kaiserreich (Munich,
2006), 39.
31 According to the Journal du Pe ´trole, Austro-Hungarian reﬁners sold petroleum for 18–22 crowns/
100 kg within the monarchy, but for only 3.5 crowns/100 kg in export markets. “Note sur les Pe ´troles
de Galicie,” June 1908, AHCL, DEEF, 30167, E ´tude no. 303.2, 10–11; Journal du Pe ´trole, March 1, 1908,
11.
32 “Enquete u ¨ber die Krise in der Mineralo ¨lindustrie,” 15. MacGarvey was born in Canada and
emigrated to Galicia in the 1880s. He was Austrian by neither citizenship nor nationality, but only by
business interest—the relevant category here.
33 Neurath, “Massnahmen zur Sanierung der Lage der o ¨sterr. Petroleumindustrie.”
34 “Note sur les Pe ´troles de Galicie,” June 1908, AHCL, DEEF, 30167, E ´tude no. 303.2, 14. Con-
trolling shares in OLEX were owned by the Deutsche Erdo ¨l-AG, which was in turn charged with man-
aging the oil interests of one of the largest German banks, the Disconto-Gesellschaft. Rivalries with
Standard Oil in the German market can therefore be assumed to have played some role in discrimination
against Vacuum in the setting of export quotas. For a more thorough explanation of the relationship
between the Disconto-Gesellschaft, Deutsche Erdo ¨l-AG, and OLEX, see Chandler, Scale and Scope,
438–440.
35 “Ste ´s pe ´trolife `res en Galicie,” AHCL, DEEF, 22085, folder MB3.
36 The directors of Vacuum Oil Company AG (Vienna), Julius Weiss and George W. Hooker,
claimed that they had been allotted only 110 cars of reﬁned petroleum per year for domestic distribution,
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facilities and facing the prospect of bankruptcy, toyed with the idea of reaching an
agreement with Vacuum for storage of their crude oil. This would have put an end
to the favorable prices that reﬁners enjoyed, and it would have enabled Vacuum to
elude the restrictions that OLEX was trying to enforce.37
Recognizing that they could not win a battle with Standard on their own, reﬁners
called on the imperial government to take action. Their faith that it would do so
reﬂects a general consensus in Austria that the government was obliged to support
domestic industry through the bureaucracy rather than the legislature. Imperial Aus-
trian bureaucracy, dubbed Bu ¨rokretinismus (bureau-cretinism) by the acerbic Vi-
ennese wit Karl Kraus, has a bad reputation. One prominent historian of Austria
could praise it only in its inefﬁciency, noting that “the propensity of bureaucracy to
stumble over red tape engendered that ‘absolutism mitigated by Schlamperei [slop-
piness],’ whose loopholes made life bearable in what might otherwise have been an
oppressive state.”38 Such criticism notwithstanding, the imperial bureaucracy was
also a cornerstone of Austrian society—in particular after the Great Depression of
1873–1896. In its aftermath, Austria moved toward a form of organized capitalism,
deﬁned by the Austrian economic historian Franz Baltzarek as “that form of eco-
nomic order which bid free competitive capitalism adieu, and represented a con-
centrated, internally bureaucratized economic order organized through business as-
sociations and secured by state interventions.”39 According to legal historian David
Gerber, in the post-depression environment, “government activity seemed to many
to be the only way out of the economic doldrums.”40
True to this model, the government’s reaction was swift. Prime Minister Richard
Baron Bienerth asked each of the relevant ministries to submit suggestions for ac-
tion.41 The minister of foreign affairs, Alois Count Aerenthal, was responsible for
managing any diplomatic repercussions of a trade war with a company that the Amer-
icans claimed as their own. The minister of public works, August Ritt, ran a state-
owned oil reﬁnery in Drohobycz that was the largest purchaser of crude oil in the
empire and the largest non-Russian reﬁnery in Europe. The minister of railways,
Ludwig Wrba, controlled access to tank cars, switching lines, ﬁll stations, and other
installations that enabled oil reﬁners to transport crude and reﬁned oil products via
rail. The minister of commerce, Richard Weiskirchner, was responsible for granting
concessions to and regulating the operation of reﬁneries and distribution organi-
while “other reﬁneries of the same capacity were allowed a quantity of 2500 cars.” Weiss and Hooker
to Richard Kerens, U.S. Ambassador in Vienna, July 23, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 363.115 V 13.
37 Hidy and Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, 513. On the other hand, backed by Standard and its
“unlimited ﬁnancial resources,” Vacuum would have been able to provide sufﬁcient storage facilities to
make price collapse caused by overproduction a thing of the past. “The Standard in Galicia,” Petroleum
Review, June 19, 1909, 357–358, 366.
38 William Johnston, The Austrian Mind (Berkeley, Calif., 1972), 48, 50.
39 Franz Baltzarek, “Franz Klein als Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitiker,” in Herbert Hofmeister, ed.,
Forschungsband Franz Klein: Leben und Wirken (Vienna, 1988), 173.
40 David Gerber, “The Origins of European Competition Law in Fin-de-Sie `cle Austria,” American
Journal of Legal History 36, no. 4 (October 1992): 414.
41 “Amtserinnerung betreffend die von der Regierung zum Schutze der heimischen Petroleumin-
dustrie zu ergreifenden Massnahmen,” June 18, 1910, O ¨StA, Ministerrats-Pra ¨sidium [hereafter MP],
2462.
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applied to oil production, reﬁning, sales, and consumption. The minister for Galicia,
W adys aw Ritter von Du ˛ eba, was responsible for representing the interests of the
empire’s only signiﬁcant oil-producing province. A conference held at the Finance
Ministry on June 8, 1910, brought them all together to consider “drastic measures
for the protection of the home petroleum industry.”42 Molding a lex specialis that
would simultaneously punish Standard’s cronies and leave everyone else unharmed
required all the creative talents that the administration could muster. Discussion
quickly focused on a conﬁdential proposed revision of petroleum freight tariff policy
that had been circulated by Railway Minister Wrba. Wrba’s proposal included new
conditions determining eligibility for long-established discounts on shipping petro-
leum products that neither Vacuum nor any other reﬁnery under the inﬂuence of
Standard could possibly satisfy.43 The Railway Ministry, boasting that “at the time
of the existence of the private railways, such a measure would have been impossible,”
may have been motivated in part by a desire to demonstrate its own usefulness.44
Other ministries were at a loss to suggest better alternatives, and given the urgent
needto“freeAustrianreﬁneriesfromthepressureofAmericancompetitionasmuch
as possible,” they followed Wrba’s plan to manipulate railway tariffs.45Without men-
tioning Standard or Vacuum by name, the new regulations were designed to drive
Vacuum and its allied reﬁneries out of business.
In only two weeks, new tariff rules increased freight costs for the targeted re-
ﬁneries by 70 percent and more.46 Vacuum estimated that the higher prices alone
would cost it $1,000 (U.S.) per day, and the Railway Ministry predicted that “given
such extraordinary freight increases, the named reﬁners will hardly be in a position
to maintain operations.”47 But the discriminatory measures did not end there. In
mid-June, the Railway Ministry canceled the hauling contract that allowed Vacuum
to use tank cars on state railways, as well as contracts allowing the company to con-
nect its storage tanks with the government-owned ﬁlling pipes required to load crude
oil into tank cars. Most crippling to Vacuum’s daily operations, on September 10,
the Railway Ministry put into effect the cancellation of a contract that allowed Vac-
uum to use a switch connection between its reﬁnery at Dzieditz/Dziedzice and the
railway.48 The reﬁnery was then effectively cut off from the rest of the world. Iron-
ically, Standard Oil faced elimination from the Austrian market thanks to discrim-
inatory limits on access to railways.
The Petroleum War was possible only because of the nineteenth century’s trans-
42 Weiss and Hooker to Kerens, NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 363.115 V 13.
43 “Tarifmaßnahmen zur Unterstu ¨tzung der heimischen Petroleumindustrie,” May 30, 1910, O ¨StA,
Mfo ¨A, F664, Z634.
44 “Antrag, betreffend teilweise Aenderung der Petroleumtarife der k.k. o ¨sterr. Staatsbahnen,” May
29, 1910, O ¨StA, Mfo ¨A, F664, Z634. The Railway Ministry was created in 1896. Walter Goldinger, “Die
Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien—Die zivile gemeinsame Zentralverwaltung,” in Adam Wandruszka
and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918, vol. 2: Verwaltung und Rechtswesen
(Vienna, 1975), 146.
45 Ritt’s and Weiskirchner’s responses to Bienerth’s request for position statements, June 9 and 10,
1910, O ¨StA, MP, Z2411.
46 “Resume ´u ¨ber die Besprechungen des Ministerialtarifkomitees vom 1. und 6. Juni 1910, betre-
ffend Maßnahmen zur Unterstu ¨tzung der heimischen Petroleumindustrie,” O ¨StA, Mfo ¨A, F664, Z634.
47 “Antrag, betreffend teilweise Aenderung der Petroleumtarife der k.k. o ¨sterr. Staatsbahnen,” ibid.
48 Charles Everest to Knox, New York, October 26, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/37.
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steamships; Austria’s ability to ﬁght Standard at home and compete with it abroad
was dependent on railroads. While historians and economists are rightly inclined to
trumpet the many accomplishments of the railroad, this episode reminds us that
railroads were also a tool for the uneven dispensation of economic power—not just
by virtue of their existence in some places and not in others, but also by virtue of
their manipulation. The irony of a story about discriminatory railroad pricing used
against, rather than by, Standard was appreciated by outside observers, who, at a
distance, were able to derive a measure of amusement from the whole conﬂict. The
Times of London noted that Austria applied “methods of administrative chicanery
and railway discrimination strikingly similar to those which made the name of the
Standard Oil Company a byword in the United States.” Under the motto that im-
itation is the highest form of ﬂattery, it went on to observe: “The tactics of the
Austrianauthoritiesareasindefensible,orasdefensible,asarethoseoftheStandard
Oil Company; but, as a sense of humour is not always an asset in business and di-
plomacy,” the State Department had “made diplomatic representations to the Aus-
tro-Hungarian Foreign Ofﬁce on behalf of the American . . . interests affected by
Austrian ﬂattery of Mr. Rockefeller.”49 The Times was alluding to Rockefeller’s own
record of having “expanded his position in reﬁning by ‘raising rivals’ costs.’”50 It was
not by offering reﬁned products at impossibly low prices that Rockefeller was able
to secure Standard’s dominance in the domestic oil industry, but rather by colluding
with those railroads that together controlled the transportation of crude oil from and
to points of production and reﬁning. According to economists Elizabeth Granitz and
Benjamin Klein, “Standard and the railroads, by cooperating with one another, did
something jointly that neither of them could do separately—they created a monop-
oly.” Their analysis shows “that it was petroleum transportation, not reﬁning, that
was monopolized and that the proﬁts earned by Standard in reﬁning should be
thought of as merely a share of the monopoly proﬁts from the transportation car-
tel.”51 Austria’s best model in using railroads to hamstring Vacuum Oil was Standard
Oil itself.
Rockefeller’s infamous octopus, the Standard Oil Trust, was one of the most
powerful corporations in the world at the time, but it was also surrounded by en-
emies. Ida Tarbell’s denunciation of Rockefeller had already been published in mul-
tiple editions, and was available in bookstores across the United States.52 In Wash-
ington, members of Congress had been enacting legislation directed at curbing
Standard’s business operations since 1906, and their antipathy showed no sign of
abating; in addition, dozens of individual states had initiated lawsuits against the
Trust.53 The federal government had ﬁled a suit to dissolve the company under the
49 “Hungarian Finance: The Failure of the Loan Negotiations,” Times (London), September 15,
1910, 5.
50 Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein, “Monopolization by ‘Raising Rivals’ Costs’: The Standard
Oil Case,” Journal of Law and Economics 39, no. 1 (April 1996): 23.
51 Ibid., 24, 27; Johnson, “Public Policy and Concentration in the Petroleum Industry, 1870–1911,”
in Oil’s First Century: Papers Given at the Centennial Seminar on the History of the Petroleum Industry,
Harvard Business School, November 13–14, 1959 (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 47.
52 Ida Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company (New York, 1904).
53 Lawsuits were pending in Kentucky, Tennessee, Kansas, Missouri, West Virginia, Connecticut,
Ohio, Arkansas, Maryland, Texas, and Oklahoma. Hidy and Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, 674–676,
26 Alison Frank
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW FEBRUARY 2009terms of the Sherman Antitrust Act in November of 1906 that would surpass in
documentation and expense anything previously seen in the United States.54 The
Trust’s last hope of avoiding dissolution was put to the test when arguments before
the Supreme Court began on March 14, 1910.55 All of America—the public, state
and federal government, state and circuit courts—had lost patience with the incom-
parable strength that Standard Oil’s predatory practices, sophisticated networks,
deep pockets, and general business acumen had allowed it to build up across the
country. It was this perceived tension between the U.S. government and Standard
Oil that convinced Austrian ofﬁcials that they could take action against Standard’s
Austrian subsidiary, Vacuum Oil, with impunity. But when the Austrian imperial
government assumed that discriminatory measures taken against Standard Oil on
foreign soil would be welcome to a government prosecuting Standard at home, it was
gravely mistaken. Far from greeting the Austrian measures as assistance in punishing
a greedy multinational corporation, the State Department opposed them as unfair
attacks on an important U.S. business interest.
In the context of battles with larger rivals, the asymmetric conﬂict between the
Standard Oil Trust and Austrian reﬁners might well have been dismissed by Standard
684; Allan Nevins, Study in Power: John D. Rockefeller, Industrialist and Philanthropist, 2 vols. (New York,
1953), 2: 356.
54 Chernow, Titan, 538. Before it even reached the Supreme Court, the case had cost an estimated
$4 million and produced a court record of approximately 11.5 million words. “Millions Spent in Oil
Prosecution,” New York Times, January 16, 1909, 14.
55 “Oil Fight Begins in Supreme Court,” New York Times, March 15, 1910, 3.
FIGURE 1: “Next!” This cartoon by Udo J. Keppler, which was published in Puck on September 7, 1904, depicts
Standard Oil as an octopus whose tentacles have already grabbed the steel, copper, and shipping industries,
an unidentiﬁed statehouse, and the U.S. Capitol; another tentacle is poised to capture the White House. The
last three tentacles stretch out across the Atlantic, presumably toward Europe. Color lithograph, Library of
Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C., LC-USZC4-435 (color ﬁlm copy transparency).
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in disgust and move elsewhere. On the contrary, Vacuum responded to the discrim-
inatory measures by calling on another government for support: that of the majority
of its stockholders, the United States. It did this not by appealing directly to the U.S.
ambassador in Vienna, but rather by turning to Standard Oil and its chief diplomat,
William Herbert Libby. Libby, who had worked for Standard Oil for thirty-two years
and had represented its foreign interests since he was ﬁrst sent to the Far East in
1882, barraged the secretary of state with letters demanding that Vacuum’s interests
be taken up by the U.S. government.56 According to Ralph and Muriel Hidy, “No
agent of Standard Oil journeyed further, saw more prominent people, or had a
greater inﬂuence” than Libby. He was “a personable and cultivated representative,
an experienced merchant of oil, an astute observer of trade conditions, an able judge
of men, and a tenacious negotiator.”57 Much of the diplomatic language that the
State Department used in its communications with Austria-Hungary throughout this
dispute actually originated with Libby.
Libby’ssuccessingalvanizingtheStateDepartmentintoactiondemonstratesthat
even though the breakup of the Trust was less than a year away, the U.S. government
was not indifferent to Standard’s treatment abroad. A German newspaper warned
that the Viennese suggestion “that the American government does not appear to
attend to Vacuum Oil Co., because ‘the hatred of Standard Oil Co. in America is
so great that no one in Washington wants to lift a ﬁnger to help it,’ directly con-
tradicts the real facts, and such an erroneous perception of circumstances could lead
to a very dangerous tight-rope dance.”58 Since the attack on Standard within Austria
took place in the context of presumed U.S. indifference to the company’s fate, it
reminds us that the breakup of the Trust—anticipated for several years before it was
formally mandated by the Supreme Court on May 15, 1911—had repercussions be-
yond the United States: America’s business was everybody’s business.59 Reconnect-
ing the dissolution of the Standard Oil Trust with the treatment of Standard Oil
outside the U.S. can help us meet Thomas Bender’s call to “imagine an American
historical narrative that situates the United States more fully in its larger transna-
tional and intercultural global context.”60 By pursuing its interests in Austria, Stan-
dard Oil was not only protecting its market share there, but also demonstrating that
the dissolution of the Trust at home should not be interpreted as Standard’s vul-
56 Correspondence between Libby and the secretary of state from June 20, 1910, until the spring
of 1912 in NARA, RG 59, Boxes 4461 and 4462. Hidy and Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, 137. Libby
continued to lobby on behalf of Vacuum Oil in 1911 after the breakup of the Trust, supporting the claim
that “co-ordination of the activities of [the successors to the Trust] continued through common own-
ership and by virtue of long-established relationships which no legal decree could destroy overnight.”
Arthur Johnson, “Continuity and Change in Government-Business Relations,” in John Braeman, Robert
Bremner, and Everett Walters, eds., Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century America (Columbus,
Ohio, 1965), 201.
57 Hidy and Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, 136.
58 Dmd 14, f. 44, L’vivs’ka Naukova Biblioteka im. Stefanyka, L’viv, Ukraine.
59 “Standard Oil Company Must Dissolve in 6 Months,” New York Times, May 16, 1911, 1. For
greater reﬂection on “the integration of the United States into the capitalist world economy” and the
opportunities it affords transnational history, see Ian Tyrell, “American Exceptionalism in an Age of
International History,” American Historical Review 96, no. 4 (October 1991): 1044–1050.
60 Thomas Bender, “Introduction: Historians, the Nation, and the Plenitude of Narratives,” in
Bender, ed., Rethinking American History in a Global Age (Berkeley, Calif., 2002), 10.
28 Alison Frank
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW FEBRUARY 2009nerability abroad. Ironically, however, this “transnational” context highlights the
great relevance of “nationalist” thinking and state support.
To move the State Department to action, Libby argued that more than Vacuum’s
business interest was at stake. Vacuum was “the most important American enterprise
inthatEmpire,”andotherAmericanbusinessmenwouldwatchitsfateclosely.61U.S.
ofﬁcials agreed that Vacuum’s vulnerability to Austrian persecution would set a per-
ilous example. Only two days after it received Libby’s initial complaint, the State
Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs received a cablegram from the U.S.
consul general in Vienna, Charles Harvey Denby, Jr.62 In the inelegant language of
telegraph communications, Denby warned that “if equality of opportunity American
capital in this important matter is not maintained precedent will be established dan-
gerous other American interests.” The Austrians, he continued, assumed that their
actions “towards this American group . . . will be agreeable the Government of the
United States.”63 Assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson responded by in-
structing Ambassador Richard C. Kerens to “make immediate representation to the
Austro-Hungarian government requesting that the proposed repressive measures be
suspended”—a proposal very much in keeping with Kerens’s personal inclination.64
Standard could hardly have hoped for a more sympathetic representative in Vienna.
Kerens had a long history in both business and politics.65 He was a board member
of Edward Doheny’s Mexican Petroleum Company and had spent ten years on the
Continental Railway Commission; Doheny’s biographer called him a stellar example
of “the rising class of western businessmen.”66He served on the Republican National
Committee for decades.67 In return for his loyalty, President William Howard Taft
appointed him to a “diplomatic post of the ﬁrst rank”—ambassador to Austria-Hun-
gary—shortly after his inauguration in 1909.68 Standard had in Kerens a staunch
Republican and a lifelong defender of the spirit of enterprise who, in his many years
in business, had relied more than once on personal connections with well-placed
politicians—and with representatives of Standard Oil.69 But Kerens’s reliance on
61 The phrase originates in a letter from Libby to Knox (October 26, 1910) and was adopted by the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs (October 31, 1910). NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.113 V 13/37.
62 Denby had been transferred to the U.S. consulate in Vienna in 1909 from Shanghai, where he
had been U.S. consul general.
63 Denby to Knox, June 18, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 25024/1.
64 Huntington Wilson to Kerens, Washington, D.C., June 22, 1910, ibid.
65 Francis Weber, Encyclopedia of California’s Catholic Heritage, 1769–1999 (Mission Hills, Calif.,
2001), 973.
66 John A. Caruso, “The Pan American Railway,” Hispanic American Historical Review 31, no. 4
(November 1951): 613; Dan La Botz, Edward L. Doheny: Petroleum, Power, and Politics in the United
States and Mexico (New York, 1991), 14. Kerens was a principal stockholder and director of the Inter-
Mountain Oil Company, capitalized at $10 million in 1902. “To Develop Oil Lands in Wyoming,” New
York Times, September 7, 1901, 12.
67 Kerens worked tirelessly on the presidential campaigns of both Benjamin Harrison and William
Howard Taft. His senatorial campaigns in Missouri were hindered by suspicion among his fellow Re-
publicans of his “militant” Catholicism. Correspondence between Thomas Benson Whitledge and Ke-
rens, Edward Rozier, and Benjamin Cahoon, 1874–1908, Thomas Benson Whitledge Papers, R276,
Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of Missouri–Rolla. Kerens was a “militant cham-
pion of strict interpretation of the laws of the Roman Catholic Church throughout his life.” “Is Divorce
Good Behavior? Court Must Settle Point,” New York Times, October 13, 1929, M4.
68 “Many Plums to Give,” New York Times, November 16, 1909, 5.
69 For example, Kerens called on Russell Harrison to intervene with the secretary of war on behalf
of one of his companies. Kerens to Harrison, St. Louis, Mo., August 15, 1891, Harrison, R. B. Mss.,
Manuscripts Department, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington. In 1902, Kerens recom-
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stead within the Austrian diplomatic environment.70 Although the Viennese post
may have been a pleasant one thanks to the imperial capital’s social and cultural
standing, Austro-American diplomatic relations were not a priority for either coun-
try.71 Nor was Austria-Hungary willing to bend protocol to suit Kerens. Diplomatic
procedure mandated that all his correspondence go through the Foreign Ofﬁce. Al-
though Vacuum was regularly referred to as an “American” company in internal
ministerial correspondence, Foreign Minister Aerenthal rebuffed Kerens’s efforts to
broker an agreement by repeating ad nauseam that Vacuum was a domestic com-
pany, and thus relations between Austria and Vacuum did not fall under the purview
of a foreign ambassador—or of the foreign minister. Even the U.S. State Depart-
ment’s Bureau of Trade Relations had to admit internally that “this policy is purely
a domestic affair and is none of the business of the United States.”72 Nevertheless,
while Aerenthal appeared to be an impenetrable wall allowing no intercourse be-
tween the U.S. embassy and his own government, he diligently forwarded Kerens’s
increasingly impatient appeals to Prime Minister Bienerth.73 Bienerth in turn for-
warded them to the relevant Austrian ministries (Commerce, Finance, Public Works,
Railways, and Galicia), and it was Minister of Commerce Weiskirchner, in consul-
mended to Doheny that they “sell a half interest” of the Mexican Petroleum Company either to Standard
or to an afﬁliate. Kerens expected to be able to “get Mr. [Henry Clay] Pierce to go down there [Mexico]
with me” to share in his “greatest delight . . . good hunting.” Kerens to Doheny, Chicago, July 20, 1902,
Archival Center, Archdiocese of Los Angeles, Papers of Carrie Estelle and Edward L. Doheny. Kerens
peppered his correspondence with phrases such as “I will, of course, stand by the friends who have stood
by me” and “I will help in any way I can, and stand squarely by my friends.” Kerens to Whitledge, October
6, 1896, and February 23, 1903, Whitledge Papers.
70 This is not to say that personalities and individual relationships were insigniﬁcant. J. Schwegel,
an Austrian imperial consul for Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia in Winnipeg,
privately offered a possible explanation to Kerens in the summer of 1911: “I had the impression that
a great deal of ill feeling in this affair on the part of our Government has been caused by the insolent
mannerinwhichsomeoftherepresentativesoftheAmericanCompanyhavebeenbehaving,thusmaking
it difﬁcult for our Government to give in, no matter how peacefully inclined at heart.” Kerens to Wilson,
Elkins, W.Va., August 28, 1911, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/84; J. Schwegel to Kerens,
Bolzano, July 9, 1911, ibid.
71 Almost all of the press coverage of Ambassador Kerens in the United States revolved around
social events, such as the de ´but, and later the engagement, of his daughter Gladys. “Fashion’s Fads and
Fancies,” Washington Post, August 1, 1910, 7. Diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary and the
United States had been temperate since the revolutions of 1848; the two states interacted only to resolve
minor disagreements over immigration or the ﬁlling of diplomatic posts. Harry Hanak, “Die Einstellung
GrossbritanniensundderVereinigtenStaatenzuO ¨sterreich(-Ungarn),”inWandruszkaandUrbanitsch,
Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918, vol. 6, pt. 2: Die Habsburgermonarchie im System der Internation-
alen Beziehungen (Vienna, 1993), 557. The most common source of conﬂicts was whether it was ap-
propriate for naturalized U.S. citizens who had previously been citizens of Austria-Hungary to be com-
pelled to fulﬁll outstanding obligations to serve in the Austro-Hungarian military if they returned to
Austria-Hungary. Rudolf Agstner has surmised that the monthly reports sent by consuls in the 1890s
“probably ended up unread in a drawer.” Agstner, “From Apalachicola to Wilkes-Barre: Austria(-Hun-
gary) and Its Consulates in the United States of America, 1820–1917,” Austrian History Yearbook 38
(2006): 167. Nicole Phelps argues that nearly all diplomatic communication between the U.S. and Aus-
tria-Hungary can be grouped into one of three categories: conﬂicts over diplomatic ceremony, disputes
over trade (primarily over tariffs), and migration-related issues. Phelps, “Sovereignty, Citizenship, and
the New Liberal Order: US-Habsburg Relations and the Transformation of International Politics, 1880–
1924” (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 2008).
72 Charles Pepper, “Standard Oil Case in Austria-Hungary,” stamped as received August 20, 1910,
NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 25024/21.
73 Aerenthal to Bienerth, November 3, 1910, O ¨StA, Finanzministerium [hereafter FM], Pra ¨s. Z2111.
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handle this affair, who drafted the responses that Aerenthal would render into more
diplomatic language and then send on to Kerens.74 Because of this insistence that
no direct communication between the U.S. ambassador and the relevant Austrian
ministries could take place, each side spent considerable energy trying to divine the
“true” positions of decision-makers in the other country. And throughout the dis-
pute, the State Department found itself relying and acting on information gathered
and interpreted by representatives of Standard Oil.
JUST AS KERENS WAS SURPRISED BY Austria-Hungary’s refusal to grant him any ju-
risdiction over what it argued was a purely domestic matter, so, too, was the Austro-
Hungarian Foreign Ministry shocked to discover that the U.S. government felt any
sense of obligation to protect Standard Oil. Was it not true that, as a government-
friendly newspaper noted, “in the Union itself, a war of extermination is being waged
against the tyrannous supremacy of the oil trust”?75 Heinrich Ritter Lo ¨wenthal von
Linau, legation counselor in the Austro-Hungarian embassy in Washington, D.C.,
noted in a conﬁdential letter to Aerenthal, “It seems to me self-evident, that the
higher powers in the current federal government, in so far as they are concerned with
such matters at all, allow themselves to be led by the effort to accord the same
powerful Trust, against which they, in the real or imagined electoral interest of the
Republican Party, claim to proceed with all the strength of the law in their own
country, the greatest possible signs of affection on foreign soil.”76 From the per-
spective of the Taft administration, the overlying principle of the case was not the
ﬁght against Standard’s monopoly within the United States, but rather the admin-
istration’s support of U.S. businesses abroad, a policy known to its critics as “Dollar
Diplomacy.”
President Taft boasted in 1909 that his Republican administration was “lending
all proper support to legitimate and beneﬁcial American enterprises in foreign coun-
tries,” and that the State Department would soon reveal itself to be “a thoroughly
efﬁcient instrument in the furtherance of foreign trade and of American interest
abroad.”77 Taft’s proclaimed advocacy of U.S. businesses overseas was taken as a
74 “Regierungsmassnahmen gegen die Vacuum Oil Company,” July 23, 1910, O ¨StA, Mfo ¨A, F664,
Z874-XIV, ex. 1910; or “Neuerliche Intervention der amerikanischen Botschaft in Angelegenheit der
Vacuum Oil Company,” November 21, 1910, O ¨StA, FM, 85817. Other examples include FM, Z76227,
October 19, 1910, and O ¨StA, Mfo ¨A, F664, Z981.
75 “Die Vorga ¨nge in der Petroleumindustrie,” Neues Wiener Tagblatt (Vienna), October 9, 1910,
NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.113 V 13/36.
76 Heinrich Lo ¨wenthal von Linau to Aerenthal, Washington, D.C., November 10, 1911, Haus-, Hof-
und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Austria [hereafter HHStA], Ministerium des A ¨ußern [hereafter MdA], Ad-
ministrative Registratur [hereafter AR], F97/10, Handelsartikel-Petroleum, folder 97 Petroleum 69c.
77 Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise, 74. Rockefeller had endorsed Taft in the 1908
election: “He is not a man, I judge, . . . to impede the return of prosperity by advocating measures
subversive of industrial progress.” Chernow, Titan, 553. This attitude was politically contingent, and not
a constant feature of U.S. foreign policy. George Gibb and Evelyn Knowlton insist that “at no time in
the 1912–1917 period was effective diplomatic action taken to back Jersey Standard in its efforts to
acquire oil reserves in the face of determined resistance from strong competitors and strong foreign
governments,” which reﬂects a change in U.S. foreign policy once Woodrow Wilson replaced Taft as
president. The Wilson administration’s opposition to “economic imperialism” and its belief that the U.S.
government was duty-bound to “free [foreign, but particularly Latin American] countries of foreign
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his assistant secretary of state, Huntington Wilson, “gave a new deﬁniteness, intel-
ligibility and practicalness to American diplomacy.”78 Nevertheless, the State De-
partment weighed the merits of individual cases carefully before “drawing off for the
protection of a foreign enterprise a measure of the national prestige and power
entrusted by the people to its care.”79 And, despite Consul General Denby’s urgings
in June of 1910 and the Bureau of Trade Relations’ eagerness to show “that we do
not neglect our commercial interests abroad whatever legal action we may feel it
desirable to take at home in regard to some of them,” the State Department was slow
to consider any action beyond diplomatic appeals to Foreign Minister Aerenthal.80
So, although Charles Pepper of the Bureau of Trade Relations argued in August that
“a growing tendency has been shown on the part of foreign governments to take
advantage of domestic affairs of this kind [i.e., the breakup of the Trust] to injure
American enterprise abroad and it is well at every opportunity to let them under-
stand that the United States will not tolerate such a course,” Assistant Secretary of
State Wilson replied laconically: “Pretty small real American interest and pretty
weak case—so far shown. I think we should go not too zealously.”81 Wilson’s main
concern was to ensure that the share of European oil markets held by companies
shipping oil from the United States did not decrease—not to guarantee that Vacuum
could maintain its business operations within Austria-Hungary. Libby had presented
Standard’s own goal as “to safeguard to the fullest extent practicable the supremacy
of American Petroleum” in Europe—but would this goal be served by defending
Vacuum Oil?82 To negotiate a deal that would help Vacuum within Austria but hurt
Standard in the much larger German market, for example, appeared senseless:
“There would not be much advantage,” Pepper noted, “in helping the Vacuum Oil
Company to settle the controversy on a basis which would result in the Standard Oil
Company decreasing its shipments from the United States to the German and other
markets.”83 The State Department politely forwarded Libby’s stream of protests to
Kerens, but did nothing throughout the summer to raise the stakes.
In October 1910, however, veteran State Department ofﬁcial Alvey Augustus
Adee ominously cabled Kerens that he hoped for a speedy “friendly solution of this
controversy” so that “it will not be necessary to proceed to measures of trade re-
taliation which otherwise this Government would undoubtedly be bound to sup-
domination” made it largely unwilling to use the State Department or the U.S. military as a tool to
advance U.S. business abroad. George Sweet Gibb and Evelyn H. Knowlton, The Resurgent Years, 1911–
1927 (New York, 1956), 107; Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise, 166. According to
Gu ¨nter Bischof, on the eve of the First World War, “the question was only whether the USA would ever
intervene in European affairs in order to secure its export markets.” Bischof, “Das amerikanische Jahr-
hundert: Europas Niedergang-Amerikas Aufstieg,” Zeitgeschichte 28 (March–April 2001): 75–95. This
incident suggests that the State Department had already determined that it should, but that it had
difﬁculty ﬁnding the means to act on that determination.
78 Huntington Wilson, “The Relation of Government to Foreign Investment,” Annals of the Amer-
ican Academy of Political and Social Science 68 (November 1916): 299.
79 Ibid., 300.
80 Pepper to Wilson, July 14, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 25024/7.
81 Pepper, “Standard Oil Case in Austria-Hungary,” and Wilson’s penciled marginalia on a memo
from Pepper to Wilson, August 19, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 25024/21.
82 Libby to Knox, New York, June 6, 1911, ibid., 363.115 V 13/80.
83 Pepper, “Standard Oil Case in Austria-Hungary,” 5.
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AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW FEBRUARY 2009port.”84 The change of attitude that produced this telegram can be explained only
by reference to developments not in Washington or Vienna, but rather in France.
At the same time that the Austrian government had targeted Vacuum, it had taken
the same discriminatory measures against another company rumored to be closely
allied with the Americans: the Petroleum Licht und Kraft Gesellschaft (Petroleum
Light and Power Company), better known as Limanowa, after the Galician town
where its reﬁnery was located. Limanowa’s organization paralleled Vacuum’s—al-
though it was ofﬁcially incorporated in Austria (hence the German name), its stock-
holders were French. It had been founded in 1904 by Desmarais Fre `res, one of
France’s most important petroleum reﬁners, after an increase in French import du-
ties on foreign crude made it more proﬁtable to reﬁne near the source.85 Allegations
of collusion between Vacuum and Limanowa were reported widely in both Austrian
government documents and the international press. For example, an article in the
London Times asserted, “This company [Limanowa], in which some £500,000 of
French capital are invested . . . is understood to have been working in some kind of
unconfessed relationship with the Austrian branch of the Standard Oil Company of
America, known as the Vacuum Oil Company.”86
Diplomatic relations with France, unlike those with the United States, were a
high priority for Austria-Hungary—and they were already strained. Ever since Aus-
tria-Hungary had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, French public opinion and
French diplomacy had been united in anticipation of a coming confrontation with
the Habsburg monarchy.87 But Austria-Hungary’s Foreign Ministry saw no reason
why its dispute with Vacuum should cause tension with France. Austria’s government
ministers were convinced that Limanowa was merely a puppet of Vacuum, and ul-
timately of Standard, and that it therefore was an agent of Standard’s interest, not
France’s. Back in June, the minister of foreign affairs had instructed Albert Count
Nemes, minister plenipotentiary at the monarchy’s embassy in Paris, to explain to
the French government that “France’s interests not only are not injured by our mea-
sures [against Limanowa], but are, rather, identical to ours, since France certainly
has no reason to support the creation of a global monopoly whose impact would
affect its economic life as much as ours.”88 Limanowa’s directors did not agree. Once
again, how to assess the “true” national afﬁliation of a corporation became a matter
of bitter dispute. Did Limanowa’s board and shareholders make it “French”? Did
its incorporation in Vienna and its reﬁnery’s location make it Austrian? Did its re-
ported alliance with Standard make it an American imposter?
The French press was not concerned with such sophistry. Throughout the late
summer, French newspapers were abuzz with a campaign to discredit Austria and
84 Alvey Augustus Adee to Kerens, Washington, D.C., October 12, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462,
363.115 V 13/32.
85 Smith, Emergence of Modern Business, 425. It had 12 million crowns in capital, a 150,000-ton-
capacity reﬁnery in Limanowa, and reservoirs in Borys aw, Berlin, Wroc aw/Breslau, Leipzig, and Du ¨s-
seldorf. “Petroleum Licht und Kraft Gesellschaft a ` Vienne,” August 1919, AHCL, DEEF, 30167, Note
no. 4802; “Ste ´s pe ´trolife `res en Galicie,” AHCL, DEEF, 22085, folder MB3.
86 “Hungarian Finance.”
87 Jean Be ´renger, “Die O ¨sterreichpolitik Frankreichs von 1848 bis 1918,” in Wandruszka and Ur-
banitsch, Die Habsburgermonarchie im System der Internationalen Beziehungen, 535.
88 Aerenthal to Albert Count Nemes, June 21, 1910, HHStA, MdA, AR, F97/10, Handelsartikel-
Petroleum, folder 97 Petroleum 69a, Z38376/2191.
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to underwrite.89 In an article tellingly titled “Certain Countries Too Often Forget
That French Capital Is One of the Elements of Our Power,” the outraged journalists
at Le Matin protested: “It is impossible to comprehend how French capital could
provide prosperity in a country where French enterprises are harassed in this man-
ner.”90 Le Gaulois was equally hostile, claiming that “The [Austrian] government . . .
should know that, ﬁnancially and commercially, we have all the means to respond
to the unjustiﬁable provocation to which our national interests are subjected.”91
L’Informationcharged, “The measure was obviously brutal and of such a method that
it constitutes a ﬂagrant attack on liberty of commerce and the rights of nations.”92
Although the Austrian ambassador in Paris dismissed the rumblings of the press as
“an attempt to exploit a presented opportunity to squeeze out subventions,” the
French government soon followed through.93In mid-September, the Hungarian loan
negotiations, which Hungarian ﬁnance minister La ´szlo ´ Luka ´cs had assumed were
sure to end favorably, failed.94 Limanowa’s director warned the Ministry of Finance
that he expected punitive tariffs on Austrian petroleum products imported into
France to go into effect no later than October 26, unless Limanowa’s eligibility for
reduced crude oil freight charges, their use of the ﬁlling stands in Borys aw, and their
access to railway cars for the transport of reﬁned products were restored.95
This proved to be an effective tactic, and even while punitive measures against
Vacuum continued unabated, by November the Standing Interministerial Commit-
tee for Petroleum Affairs thought that it was time to ease off on Limanowa without
losing face.96 Austria-Hungary was forced to admit that it had miscalculated on two
counts. Not only did France steadfastly refuse to acknowledge that its interests and
Austria-Hungary’s were “identical,” but the Austrian petroleum reﬁners that the
89 Analyses of and clippings from the French press are in O ¨StA, FM, Z62775, 69236, 69525, 71345,
and 71346, and in NARA, RG 59, Box 4462. The Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs collected
newspaper clippings on the “guerre du pe ´trole” from the following papers: L’Action Franc ¸aise, L’Agence
Fournier, L’Aurore, Co ˆte de la Bourse et de la Banque, L’E ´cho de Paris, L’E ´clair, Le Figaro, Financial News,
Le Gaulois, Gil Blas, L’Information, Journal des De ´bats, Journal Ofﬁciel, La Liberte ´, Paris-Journal, Le Petit
Parisien, La Petite Re ´publique, Le Radical, La Reforme E ´conomique, La Re ´publique Franc ¸aise, Le Temps.
HHStA, MdA, AR, F97/10, Handelsartikel-Petroleum, folder 97 Petroleum 69b.
90 “On oublie trop dans certains pays que l’e ´pargne franc ¸aise est un des elements de notre puis-
sance,” Le Matin, September 17, 1910, clipping in “Ausschnitte Pariser Bla ¨tter u ¨ber die Press-Kampagne
gegen Oestereich-Ungarn,” September 26, 1910, O ¨Sta, FM, Z71345. Strictly speaking, the Austrian
government persecuting Vacuum was completely separate from the Hungarian government seeking the
loan. Following the reorganization of the empire into two separate parts in 1867, the ﬁnances of Austria
and Hungary were connected only when it came to paying for the military, the foreign service, and the
administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
91 “Une industrie franc ¸aise: L’Affaire de la Limanowa,” Le Gaulois, September 17, 1910, clipping
in O ¨StA, FM, Z71345.
92 L’Information,October7,1910,clippinginHHStA,MdA ¨,AR,F97/10,Handelsartikel-Petroleum,
folder 97 Petroleum 69b. The clipping is labeled only L’Information, but this is almost certainly the
French daily L’Information ﬁnancie `re, e ´conomique, et politique, which was published in Paris from 1899
until 1985.
93 K. u. k. Embassy in Paris, Report no. 17 G, August 6, 1910, O ¨StA, FM, Z62775.
94 “Hungarian Finance.”
95 Report of October 24, 1910, O ¨StA, MP, 2411.
96 “Beseitigung der den Betrieb der Rafﬁnerie der Petroleum Licht- und Kraftgesellschaft be-
hindernden Maßnahmen,” November 5, 1910, O ¨StA, Mfo ¨A, Pra ¨s Z1989, ex. 1910. It was essential that
any agreement not amount to a “humiliating declaration” on Austria’s part. Bilin ´ski to Aerenthal, No-
vember 10, 1910, O ¨StA, FM, Pra ¨s. Z2111.
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another—or with their government. The whole premise of the Austrian plan was that
punitive measures would force Vacuum (and Limanowa) to accept the price spec-
trum and market share allocation determined by the block of petroleum reﬁners who
participated in OLEX. When that same block of reﬁners collapsed in October, the
government had an opportunity to declare that it would change its policy based on
a transformed domestic situation, rather than because of French pressure.97 On No-
vember 3, 1910, representatives of Limanowa signed a declaration promising not to
cooperate with Vacuum in any way that could help the company evade government
measures taken against it, and pledging to work together with the other domestic
reﬁneries to regulate the sale of petroleum products in the Austrian and French
markets. In a move that reﬂected Austria’s acknowledgment that French and Amer-
ican accusations of “chicanery” might have some merit, Limanowa also agreed to
refrain from suing the Austrian administration over the “procedures” in effect up
to October 31, 1910.98 Despite the resistance of leading Austrian reﬁners, which
threatened to stymie further negotiations, lay off workers, and close down if the deal
involved conceding a decrease in Austrian reﬁned oil exports to France, the Railway
Ministry rescinded the measures against Limanowa.99
The French press magnanimously blamed the whole affair on the “excess of zeal
of subaltern employees.”100 That the agreement amounted to little more than a com-
plete capitulation on Austria’s part can be surmised by the government’s response
to a letter sent by a group of major Galician reﬁners to Du ˛ eba, the minister for
Galicia, complaining of Limanowa’s resumption of cutthroat tactics (such as dump-
ing reﬁned products in Galicia and upper Hungary). Although Du ˛ eba himself was
sympathetic, the Finance Ministry responded blandly, “The Interministerial Petro-
leum Committee is aware of this dumping on the part of Limanowa . . . and has
discussed it. No special measures were taken.”101 And so ended, rather ignomini-
ously, the Austrian government’s measures against what it referred to as “the French
Company,” Limanowa.
Fear that the United States would follow France’s example led to heightened
skepticism in the liberal Austrian press. At the same time that the French press took
up Limanowa’s case, the Neue Freie Presse argued in a September article titled “The
Petroleum War” that “it would be unprecedented folly for two states which are in
no particular opposed to each other to let diplomatic difﬁculties arise all on account
of a few stockholders of petroleum shares.” The newspaper condemned the Austrian
government for “resort[ing] to unexampled action against private interests.”102 Pub-
97 Report of October 24, 1910, O ¨StA, MP, 2411.
98 Note from Limanowa, November 3, 1910, appended to ﬁle “Beseitigung,” O ¨StA, FM, Pra ¨s. Z2111.
99 Austrian reﬁners to FM and Handelsministerium, October 28, 1910, O ¨StA, FM, Z79052. Reports
from FM and Eisenbahnministerium, November 24, 1910, ibid., FM, Pra ¨s Z2217.
100 “Beilegung der Differenzen mit der Petroleum-Licht- und Kraft-Gesellschaft LIMANOVA,” De-
cember 7, 1910, O ¨StA, FM, Z90481. Ste ´phen Pichon, the foreign minister of France, asked the French
ambassador in Vienna (at Aerenthal’s request) to make a public statement expressing his satisfaction
with the conclusion of the affair. Note Verbale no. A/124, December 7, 1910, HHStA, MdA ¨, AR, F97/10,
Handelsartikel-Petroleum, folder 97 Petroleum 69a.
101 Du ˛ eba to Ritt, December 10, 1910, O ¨StA, Mfo ¨A, F828, Z2488-XVII, ex. 1910; Du ˛ eba to Bilin ´ski,
December 10, 1910, O ¨StA, FM, Z90639.
102 “Der Petroleumkrieg,” Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), September 24, 1910. Translation by U.S. State
Department in NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/33.
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with the United States, but because consumers’ interests did not appear to be served
by the precedent of government discrimination against individual businesses, in par-
ticular when that discrimination was expected, short-term, to result in higher pe-
troleum prices.
Despite the misgivings of the Neue Freie Presse, however, the danger of U.S.
retaliation was never very grave. After “careful reexamination,” and having wit-
nessed the alacrity with which France had defended Limanowa, Assistant Secretary
of State Wilson instructed Kerens in September to threaten “appropriate retaliatory
measures” if the persecution of Vacuum was not suspended, and suggested that he
“confer with [the] French Ambassador.”103This more aggressive course of action was
approved by State Department counselor Henry Hoyt, who, while admitting that “we
would, of course, hold Austrians here under an American corporation to that rule,”
nevertheless believed that “in all such matters the Austrian government seems to be
invariably unfriendly as well as tyrannical and unprincipled.”104 The problem with
the State Department’s new forceful tone, however, was that there was little behind
it. In late October, the head of the Division for Near Eastern Affairs, Evan E. Young,
confessed to Hoyt, “we have gone about as far as we safely can in intimating that
we may be compelled to adopt retaliatory measures.”105 Even though Adee in-
structed Kerens to “leave with the Austrian authorities an impression that the con-
troversy is now reaching a critical stage,” this was little more than bluster, since the
State Department was not itself authorized to take action against Austria.106 France
had taken advantage of its traditional status as a ﬁnancial power on which Austria-
Hungary depended for loans. The State Department, however, could fall back only
on trade agreements which it knew that Austria-Hungary had not, strictly speaking,
violated.
Nevertheless, Minister of Finance Bilin ´ski oversaw negotiations with Vacuum
starting in December 1910 that led Kerens to predict in early January that “all re-
pressive measures” would be removed “within a period of eight days.”107 In a longer
letter, Kerens happily reported that Vacuum’s directors believed it “would be in a
better position than ever before to carry on its business in Austria-Hungary” since
“they had made extraordinary preparations, by the storage of large quantities of
crude oil and otherwise, for the contest which then seemed inevitable in order to
adjust the caotic [sic] conditions that existed in the Austrian oil industry.”108 But
Kerens’s proud claims that the matter was “virtually closed so far as our Government
is concerned” and that “its outcome should have a beneﬁcial inﬂuence upon other
American investments and interests in Austria-Hungary” were premature. The Aus-
trians had not given in; they had merely shifted from a tactic of confrontation to one
of cunctation. From February 1911 through the fall of 1912, Libby repeatedly com-
plained that the repressive measures the Austrians had promised to lift were still
103 Wilson to Kerens, Washington, D.C., September 16, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V
13/28.
104 H. M. Hoyt to Wilson, September 16, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/28.
105 Young to Hoyt, October 31, 1910, ibid., 363.115 V 13/37.
106 Adee to Kerens, November 1, 1910, ibid.
107 Kerens to Secretary of State, Vienna, January 5, 1911, ibid., 363.115 V 13/55.
108 Kerens to Secretary of State, Vienna, December 31, 1910, ibid., 363.115 V 13/57.
36 Alison Frank
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW FEBRUARY 2009functionallyinplace.Helamented,“ourenemieshavebeenveryactive,andwedoubt
if there has been since then any serious intention on the part of the Austrian Gov-
ernment to restore to Vacuum the rights of which it has been so long and so unjustly
deprived.” He estimated that Vacuum had lost well over $1,000,000 to date, based
on a revised estimated daily loss of $2,000.109
Upon Libby’s request, the State Department instructed Kerens to “declare that
[the U.S.] must reserve to itself the full liberty, and without notice, hereafter to
inaugurate such measures of industrial retaliation as may be found expedient from
time to time to meet the exigencies of the situation.”110 At the same time, State
Department solicitor Joshua Reuben Clark reminded Libby that “the statement as
toretaliationwasathreatandthatinallhumanprobabilitytheAustrianGovernment
was perfectly aware that it was at the present time but an empty threat, and that they
would conduct themselves accordingly.”111 Kerens soon came to agree that a “more
determined attitude would have to be assumed by the United States in order to bring
about a satisfactory settlement of the cases.”112 Consequently, in January 1912—
again at Libby’s suggestion—Acting Secretary of State Huntington Wilson appealed
to the secretary of the treasury to consider reprisals against the Austrian govern-
ment.113 He hoped to convince “the Treasury Department, through the Collector of
Customs at New York, [to] retaliate against the commercial, and perhaps navigation,
interests of Austria by rigidly enforcing laws which it is alleged are now rather lib-
erally construed.”114 Both Libby and the Bureau of Trade Relations continued to
pester the Treasury Department throughout the spring of 1912, but in July had still
not received the “clean-cut, unequivocal, detailed statement of just what it is in a
position to do.”115
By the late fall of 1912, Austria-Hungary’s delaying tactics had paid off: Vacuum
was ready to give up.116 On November 27, 1912, with Treasury Department and
congressional action still pending, Vacuum’s president in Rochester, Charles Ever-
est, and representatives of the Austrian government signed a contract “disposing of
all the controverted points between the parties” and limiting Vacuum’s Austrian
sales to 1,500 wagons of kerosene and 100 wagons of gasoline a year.117 The claim
that “this protracted, irritating and very expensive controversy” was settled was con-
109 Kerens to Secretary of State, Vienna, January 6, 1911, ibid., 363.115 V 13/58; Libby to Secretary
of State, New York, April 16, 1912, ibid., 363.115 V 13/88. Libby also noted that the actual losses of
Vacuum for 1911 alone were $465,000, not including the “loss of interest on the large capital invested
and of normal commercial proﬁts.” On January 9, 1911, before a recently concluded agreement received
“ﬁnal and ofﬁcial sanction,” the Austrian government fell—Ritt, Wrba, Du ˛ eba, and the sympathetic
Bilin ´ski were all replaced. The transition affected neither Austria-Hungary’s relations with the United
States nor government policy regarding this dispute, but it provided an excuse for further delays.
110 Knox to Kerens, Washington, D.C., March 28, 1911, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/72.
111 Clark summarizing interview with Mr. Libby, March 24, 1911, ibid.
112 Kerens to Knox, Vienna, March 30, 1911, ibid., 363.115 V 13/77.
113 Wilson to Franklin MacVeagh, January 19, 1912, ibid., 363.115 V 13/84.
114 John Ball Osborne (Chief, Bureau of Trade Relations) to Chandler P. Anderson (Counselor,
Department of State), January 12, 1912, ibid., 363.115 V 13/85.
115 Osborne to Lester H. Woolsey (Assistant Solicitor), July 22, 1912, ibid., 363.115 V 13/93.
116 HM to MdA ¨, November 29, 1912, HHStA, MdA ¨, AR, F 97/10, Handelsartikel-Petroleum, folder
97 Petroleum 69c.
117 Denby to Aerenthal, Vienna, November 27, 1912, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/94.
Austria agreed to remove all restrictions imposed on Vacuum; Vacuum agreed to withdraw its lawsuits
against Austria. HM to MdA ¨, November 29, 1912, HHStA, MdA ¨, Administrative Registratur, F97/10,
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Department’s opinion, on December 20, 1912.118
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN MORE THAN A DOZEN different agents of policy and practice
involved in the Petroleum War sheds light on the entangled history of national gov-
ernments and multinational corporations struggling to preserve their own autonomy
in the caudal years of a “globalized” age. It exposes some of the key strengths and
weaknesses of the two protagonists: the Austrian government and the Standard Oil
Trust. If the former excelled at diplomacy, it was unable to coordinate the large and
vital industry it so boldly defended against external enemies, leaving it prey to in-
ternal disruptions, disorganization, and inefﬁciency. If the latter had mastered the
“intensiﬁed trade tactics” it had fruitfully used to gain dominance at home and
abroad, it had not learned to rein in the excessive competitive zeal that kept it en-
gaged in a dispute with what would ultimately prove to be a minor player in the global
oil industry.119 But the Petroleum War also offers broader lessons that challenge
binary juxtapositions of states and markets. First, it illuminates the intimate con-
nection between diplomacy and economic activity in the context of waning European
political authority (at least in the case of Austria-Hungary) and waxing American
commercial might. Second, it explores the differences between government support
for the activities of multinational corporations (and in particular oil companies) at
home and abroad. Although corporations played a large part in extending the eco-
nomic inﬂuence of the United States in this period, they did not do so without gov-
ernment support.
The notion of a free market is not one that operated powerfully on either side
of the 1910 Petroleum War. Despite free market rhetoric, businesses—even busi-
nesses as powerful as Standard Oil—relied on diplomatic and regulatory support
from their governments. According to historian Paul Sabin, “A free market has never
existed in the United States, and it never will. In fact, government action is indis-
pensable to the very functioning of capitalism. Even when the direct regulatory role
diminishes, government action shapes economic outcomes through tax policy, prop-
erty rights, and labor law.”120 In 1910, the U.S. and Austrian governments shared the
view that it was their responsibility to defend their respective nations’ position in
international oil markets. The Petroleum War thus suggests parallels in the rela-
tionship between business and government in two states whose assessments of the
relative value of a “free market” are generally portrayed as inconsistent. Both sides
viewed their interventions not as attacks on a truly “free” market, but rather as
defensive measures against an opponent who was, in essence, cheating. From the
118 Libby to Secretary of State, New York, December 20, 1912, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115
V 13/95.
119 Of course, in 1910, neither Standard nor Galician producers knew that the Galician oilﬁelds had
begun an inexorable decline. Nevertheless, the recent discoveries of major new oilﬁelds in the Middle
East, the Far East, and the New World conﬁrmed that the future of oil exploration would not be in
continental Europe. In 1910, Europe produced 28.8 percent of the world’s petroleum; ten years later
(1920), only 5.6 percent. “Erdo ¨lfo ¨rderung der Weltteile und einzelnen La ¨nder von 1910–1925 in 1000
Tonnen,” in Schwarz, Petroleum-Vademecum, 16–17.
120 Paul Sabin, Crude Politics: The California Oil Market, 1900–1940 (Berkeley, Calif., 2005), xv.
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the unfair, dishonorable, and “tyrannical” practices developed by the “Americans”
(that is, Standard and Vacuum) was by no means a violation of “business ethics”
(Gescha ¨ftsmoral).121
For the Americans, on the other hand, Austria was itself “tyrannical” and un-
reliable, and blatantly disregarded basic principles of fairness in business. Standard
argued, and the State Department came to believe, that this dispute had negative
implications for U.S. investments abroad. Huntington Wilson noted that the gov-
ernment’s relation to foreign investment was deﬁned simultaneously by its “general
obligation to protect the citizens’ rights, and authority to control the citizens’ course
by giving great or little protection, or none at all.” Without government guarantees,
American investors would have little security when investing abroad, and the absence
of such guarantees would effectively prohibit “foreign investment in all countries
except those of the highest credit and stability.”122 If Austria-Hungary qualiﬁed as
such a country at the beginning of this dispute, it hardly did so by the end. As unfair
as its actions were—and even the Imperial Royal Supreme Court in Vienna agreed
that they were illegal—they proved effective in buying time.123 Libby thought the
lesson of the entire affair was one that revealed more American weakness than Aus-
trian.124 What the United States needed was the will to take the same kind of rapid
administrative measures that Austria had taken.
Victoria de Grazia has argued in Irresistible Empire that “America’s hegemony
was built on European territory” when it displaced Europe’s authority as the “center
of vast imperial wealth” and “astute commercial know-how.”125 But the Petroleum
War reminds us that the trajectory so skillfully traced by de Grazia was invisible to
Austria-Hungary in 1910. Insecurity about the economic might of the United States
notwithstanding, Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in this dispute suggests a sense of
operating from a position of strength, not weakness. In 1909, Galician production
had reached its all-time peak. That its decline would be rapid and steady was un-
suspected when the Petroleum War began, and unproven even when it ended. The
region had experienced temporary declines in the past, and more optimistic observ-
121 “Maßnahmen zur Unterstu ¨tzung der heimischen Petroleumindustrie,” Vienna, June 16, 1910,
O ¨StA, Mfo ¨A, F664, Z634.
122 Wilson, “The Relation of Government to Foreign Investment,” 298.
123 The Imperial Royal Supreme Court decision is available in translation in NARA, RG 59, Box
4462, 363.115 V 13/87. The legal case was based on the details of Austrian contract law and the question
of whether the Railway Ministry was legally entitled to cancel contracts before they were due to expire.
The Supreme Court’s ultimate decision in favor of Vacuum was an embarrassment to the Austrian
government; Vacuum’s agreement to withdraw its legal right to recrimination was a key component of
the ﬁnal settlement.
124 Libby to Secretary of State, New York, December 20, 1912, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.114
V 13/95.
125 Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20th-Century Europe (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 2005), 3–5. According to Richard Leopold, reference to the United States as a world
power began with John Bassett Moore’s 1903 contribution of “The United States as a World-Power
(1885–1902)” to the Cambridge Modern History’s seventh volume, and became further popularized by
Archibald Cary Coolidge and John Latane ´ in 1906–1907. Leopold, “The Emergence of America as a
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Twentieth-Century America, 4.
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AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW FEBRUARY 2009ers were conﬁdent that new ﬁelds would be found in neighboring areas to replace
those that became exhausted.126
Austria’s willingness to endure years of diplomatic strain in order to maintain
punitive measures taken without legislative backing showed its commitment to prop-
ping up its own domestic industry—and its general lack of fear of the political and
even ﬁnancial power of the United States. That lack of fear, however, did not mean
a complete lack of respect. According to Ernest May, “among powerful groups in
all continental lands, there was . . . irritation over American economic competition,
animosity toward American ideas, and some alarm at a prospective American men-
ace.”127 Austria-Hungary was not willing to challenge the State Department openly,
or to proclaim boldly its indifference to retaliatory action. Rather, it dangled the
possibility of an agreement before Vacuum’s nose for two long years, always prom-
ising that a cancellation of the discriminatory measures was at hand. Austria’s dip-
lomatic savvy and administrative creativity enabled it to fend off the State Depart-
ment successfully. This sort of passive resistance was another weapon in the arsenal
of Europeans who resented the growing power of the American economy.
Austria-Hungary’s “tight-rope dance” was required not only out of respect for
foreign relations with the United States, however, but also because the question of
how to defend the petroleum-related interests of the monarchy’s own subjects was
a very delicate one. Reﬁners included some of the more powerful ﬁnancial interests
in Vienna and Budapest; according to a Ministry of Trade estimate, the reﬁning
industry represented 250 million crowns of invested domestic capital, and employed
18,000–20,000 workers.128 Measures taken in reﬁneries’ interests would not neces-
sarily beneﬁt either their suppliers or their customers. Austrian reﬁners’ ability to
compete with Standard was hampered not only by Standard’s deep pockets and ag-
gressive tactics, but also by artiﬁcially high crude oil prices manufactured by the
government to support the Galician oil-production industry. Despite the traditional
view that the Habsburg economy was rent asunder by “ideological and nationalistic
motives,” the story of the Petroleum War of 1910 reveals no sign of nationally or even
provincially based interest groups within the monarchy itself.129 There were conﬂicts
of interest, but they were between those who proﬁted from high crude oil prices
(producers) and low crude oil prices (reﬁners) or those who proﬁted from high prices
for reﬁned products (reﬁners) and low prices for reﬁned products (distributors, con-
sumers). Only on the international stage were these deep divisions hidden behind
126 Engineer Stefan Bartoszewicz held out hope for the industry’s recovery well into the 1920s. Bar-
toszewicz, “Rozwo ´j przemys u naftowego w Polsce i jego przysz os ´c ´,” Przemys  Naftowy3, no. 19 (October
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Vademecum: International Petroleum Tables, 6th ed. (Berlin, 1929), 178. The Times noted presciently,
“The Galician ﬁeld is passing through a crisis which in the opinion of eminent authorities foreshadows
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Work,” Times (London), January 22, 1912, 22.
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Alice Teichova, Herbert Matis, and Jaroslav Pa ´tek, eds., Economic Change and the National Question
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AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW FEBRUARY 2009a united Austrian front representing the combined energies of the Viennese gov-
ernment and the oil industry it defended against the “Americans” and Standard.
In general, scholars have agreed that “the presence of multinational corporations
contributed to a smooth functioning of the international economic system” in the last
years before the First World War. As Akira Iriye has explained, “the growth of mul-
tinational enterprises . . . served to develop transnational interests and solidarities
conducive to international order.”130 This Petroleum War suggests that a multina-
tional company’s own transnational interests did not necessarily prevent it from gen-
erating nationalistic animosities in the various countries in which it operated. It
shows both the connections between American and European markets and the limits
of shared interests and perspectives. The Petroleum War of 1910 is therefore an
example of both international (“between nations”) and transnational (“across na-
tional boundaries”) history.131 Although the Austrian Foreign Ministry and the U.S.
State Department did not describe their dispute using this vocabulary, the question
of whether the Petroleum War was international or transnational was itself a bone
of contention between them. To what extent was the United States entitled to in-
tervene in or even comment on a dispute between the Austrian government and a
company incorporated within Austria, given that its shareholders were American
citizens? Although Aerenthal insisted on Vacuum’s “Austrian” status for legal rea-
sons, there was never any doubt on either side of this debate that Vacuum was in
some meaningful sense an American company. Even when proprietors of stock
moved from state to state, they took their nationality with them.
Both Austria and the United States understood the limits of the “multination-
alism” of enterprise—that, in the words of Charles Maier, “although ﬁrms plant
branches abroad and aspire to international activity, they are clearly rooted in a
home country.”132 Austria’s expectation that it could challenge Standard with im-
punity was based on its mistaken assumption that the State Department would tol-
erate—or even appreciate—foreign attacks on a company targeted for prosecution
at home. The State Department could not allow such presumption to stand. By the
end of this dispute, it was clear to everyone involved that mobility of capital did not
always mean that corporations were more powerful than states. Sometimes it meant
that they needed states’ help more than ever before.
130 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Con-
temporary World (Berkeley, Calif., 2002), 130.
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